On March 10, 2004 yet another remote control locomotive was involved in a collision, this time in Arlington, Texas. Pictures and a narrative of the incident can be found by clicking on the "remote control" button at the top right corner of this page. On the same page you can find reprint of a Fort Worth Star Telegram article by Mark Agee that describes eyewitness accounts of the incident, and also contains comments from the Union Pacific spokesman, John Bromley, as well as from the TSLB.
I want to focus on Mr. Bromley’s comments about this incident because, although these "company line" canned responses have consistently been used by railroads throughout the U.S. in response to questions about remote control, they are particularly galling in this instance.
If you read the article and the description of incident, I think you will agree that Mr. Bromley’s comments are completely inappropriate and outrageous.
For example, in the article, Mr. Bromley says when using remote control "You eliminate the chance of miscommunication."
I’ll have to admit there was no communication failure between the belt pack and the RCL in this accident, the locomotive was instructed by remote control to ram the auto rack three times and that’s exactly what it did!
Bromley also said "We have not had a single accident where it was the fault of the technology."
The BLET has documented accidents attributed to a failure of the RCL to respond as expected. That aside, this "company line" statement makes no sense in this instance because the accident happened, and was made much worse, precisely because RC was in use, and no one was watching ahead of the movement.
Bromley continues "They were all human error, as was the accident in Arlington. They would have still happened with a human engineer."
Yeah right, I’m the engineer on duty on March 10 in Arlington, Texas switching the GM plant, and I suddenly become crazed and decide it’s a good idea to ram into that auto rack that’s in my way, not once, not twice, but three times? And if I hurry, maybe I have time to knock that sucker over onto the main track in front of Amtrak? Give me a break Mr. Bromley!
The injury rate for Union Pacific remote-control locomotives was 5.2 percent lower than conventional operations in 2003, measured in injuries per 10,000 job starts, Bromley said.
Comparing injury rates using conventional and remote job starts is akin to comparing apples to oranges because conventional jobs are manned by three people, while remote control jobs are manned by two, in some cases one person. Additionally, we know that many jobs are reported to be remote control, but are manned by a full crew, including an engineer, further skewing the numbers. However, in looking at the above statement, and assuming the 10,000 starts mentioned were equally spit between remote and conventional operations, one would expect the injury rate to be 30% less for remote control operations because there are one-third less employees on those jobs.
Remote-control locomotives had a slightly higher total accident rate with .1 percent more wrecks, Bromley said.
This admission is astounding.
All railroads, when commenting on remote control operations since the first implementation, have consistently cited safety improvements when using remote control. These comments are archived in articles posted on the BLET website (click on the links button above to go there) under "Remote Control Information." None of the articles mention safety improvements of less than 30%, and one, dated September 5, 2003, even mentions a 70% improvement on the CSXT. On July 23, 2003 (posted July 24) Bromley himself said the accident rate dropped 30% where remote control was in place. What changed in the last half of 2003 on the Union Pacific?
With the Union Pacific now admitting RCL is no safer than conventional switching operations, and having dropped their bogus claim that remote control is more productive, perhaps we are witnessing the beginning of the demise of remote control. One can only hope and continue to work toward that goal.
In the meantime the FRA audit of remote control safety is ongoing and a report is due out sometime this spring.
Terry Briggs, Chairman
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NEWS
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Click on the arrows at either end to view additional pictures Click on small pictures for a larger view
Remote Control Accident Strang Yard (Houston) July 12, 2006 Switch points got split and the remote just kept pushing until it stopped
Remote Control Accident LA Switch Yard (Commerce, CA) March 8, 2006 Empty stack car shoving (RCL) into yard track struck an 18 wheeler at the crossing and pushed it 50 feet.
Remote Control Accident in Longview, Texas March 21, 2006
Remote Control Accident Damages Building in La Porte, Texas August 28, 2004
Remote Control "Mishap" Causes Damage in Arlington, Texas March 10, 2004
Remote control job H5R, on duty 13:00 on 3\10\04, using RCL UPY 626 and another unidentified trailing unit, was switching the GM plant at Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas from the west end of the plant. Weather was clear with temperatures in the mid 60s. Movements at this location are downhill, westbound, with the engine in the lead when pulling empties from the plant, eastbound with engines shoving when spotting. The RCO is stationed at the entrance to the plant, on the east end of the movement. Westward movements of the RCL are unprotected except for a closed switch at the end of the lead. No derail is installed on the lead. The track at this location is tangent, adjacent to and south of two main tracks. West of the switching lead used by the RCL switching the GM plant is another track used for storage of cars for west coast pickups. This is where the auto rack (TTGX 96550) that was overturned was stored. In order for the RCL to reach this location it either had to run through a switch on the switching lead, or the switch was left open to its movement. The distance between this switch and the entrance to the GM plant is several hundred yards. An eyewitness at the location of the crash said he heard a rumble and felt the ground shake. He went outside and saw the auto rack lying on its side with the locomotive, attached to a string of cars, still pushing against it. He said the locomotive then stopped shoving, backed up about 50 yards and again rammed the overturned car. At this point the locomotive stopped, paused for a while, and then backed up approximately one quarter mile. He said the locomotive again came back toward the auto rack, this time at full throttle, at a high rate of speed, colliding once again with the overturned car, causing metal parts to fly into the air. The locomotive had enough momentum this time to shove the auto rack out of way of its movement, and proceeded down the track. This is the point when the pictures were first taken. The witness said at this point he thought all the action was over with. A short time later he heard a train approaching, and then emergency brakes and another crash. The UP train MTXFW 10, with units NS 6681, UP 9836, UP 912 was proceeding westbound on main one when it collided with the overturned auto rack, scraping off the top of the car and the autos inside. Incidentally, this was the first train past this location after Amtrak #21, which arrived in Ft Worth at 14:51, only 20 miles away. Estimates are that Amtrak #21 was only 5 miles past this point when this collision happened. Unofficial damage estimates to the autos alone are as high as $500,000. Of course this collision was completely preventable through numerous alternative operating procedures; the most obvious of which is a person in position to protect ahead of the point of movement, preferably an engineer at the controls of the locomotive. It is also another example of yet another tragedy narrowly avoided.
Remote Control Accident - LaPorte, Texas November 3, 2003
This remote control related accident occurred in LaPorte Texas, just outside of Houston in the Strang Railyard.
Texas Rally - Fort Worth - September 2002
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