



Memorandum

To: Advisory Board; All General Chairmen; All State Legislative Board Chairmen
Cc: BLET Executive Staff; National Legislative Office; BLET RSAC ROR WG Members
From: Thomas A. Pontolillo, Assistant to the President and Director of Research
Date: April 25, 2008
Re: Good Faith Challenge

This Memorandum addresses a number of inquiries directed to Brother Tolman and me concerning the new Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) regulation pertaining to the Good Faith Challenge (“GFC”) process, which is set forth at Section 218.97 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and became effective on April 14, 2008.¹ Certain questions and issues have arisen because of the manner in which some carriers are implementing the requirement.

In order to understand the rationale and background for the GFC, a bit of history is in order. As a result of the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100–342, 102 Stat. 624) (“RSIA”), individuals became liable for civil penalties for willful violations of railroad safety laws or regulations, including those governing rail transportation of hazardous materials. *See* 49 U.S.C. §§ 21301(a)(1), 21304. FRA has published a detailed statement of its policy concerning enforcement of federal railroad safety laws in Appendix A to 49 CFR Part 209.² Of specific applicability to individual liability, FRA states as follows:

CIVIL PENALTIES AGAINST INDIVIDUALS

The RSIA amended the penalty provisions of the railroad safety statutes to make them applicable to any “person (including a railroad and any manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad)” who fails to comply with the regulations or statutes. *E.g.*, section 3 of the RSIA, amending section 209 of the Safety Act. However, the RSIA also provided that civil penalties may be assessed against individuals “only for willful violations.”

Thus, any individual meeting the statutory description of “person” is liable for a civil penalty for a willful violation of, or for willfully causing the violation of, the safety statutes or regulations. Of course, as has traditionally been the case with respect to acts of noncompliance by railroads, the FRA field inspector exercises discretion in deciding

¹ A copy of the text of Section 218.97 is appended to this Memorandum for your ready reference.

² A copy of this Appendix also is appended to this Memorandum for your ready reference.

which situations call for a civil penalty assessment as the best method of ensuring compliance. The inspector has a range of options, including an informal warning, a more formal warning letter issued by the Safety Division of the Office of Chief Counsel, recommendation of a civil penalty assessment, recommendation of disqualification or suspension from safety-sensitive service, or, under the most extreme circumstances, recommendation of emergency action.

The threshold question in any alleged violation by an individual will be whether that violation was “willful.” (Note that section 3(a) of the RSIA, which authorizes suspension or disqualification of a person whose violation of the safety laws has shown him or her to be unfit for safety-sensitive service, does not require a showing of willfulness. Regulations implementing that provision are found at 49 CFR part 209, subpart D.) FRA proposed this standard of liability when, in 1987, it originally proposed a statutory revision authorizing civil penalties against individuals. FRA believed then that it would be too harsh a system to collect fines from individuals on a strict liability basis, as the safety statutes permit FRA to do with respect to railroads. FRA also believed that even a reasonable care standard (*e.g.*, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act’s standard for civil penalty liability, 49 U.S.C. 1809(a)) would subject individuals to civil penalties in more situations than the record warranted. Instead, FRA wanted the authority to penalize those who violate the safety laws through a purposeful act of free will.

Thus, *FRA considers a “willful” violation to be one that is an intentional, voluntary act committed either with knowledge of the relevant law or reckless disregard for whether the act violated the requirements of the law.* Accordingly, neither a showing of evil purpose (as is sometimes required in certain criminal cases) nor actual knowledge of the law is necessary to prove a willful violation, but *a level of culpability higher than negligence must be demonstrated.* See *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston*, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); *Brock v. Morello Bros. Constr., Inc.*, 809 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1987); and *Donovan v. Williams Enterprises, Inc.*, 744 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Reckless disregard for the requirements of the law can be demonstrated in many ways. Evidence that a person was trained on or made aware of the specific rule involved — or, as is more likely, its corresponding industry equivalent — would suffice. Moreover, certain requirements are so obviously fundamental to safe railroading (*e.g.*, the prohibition against disabling an automatic train control device) that any violation of them, regardless of whether the person was actually aware of the prohibition, should be seen as reckless disregard of the law. See *Brock, supra*, 809 F.2d 164. Thus, a lack of subjective knowledge of the law is no impediment to a finding of willfulness. If it were, a mere denial of the content of the particular regulation would provide a defense. Having proposed use of the word “willful,” FRA believes it was not intended to insulate from liability those who simply claim — contrary to the established facts of the case — they had no reason to believe their conduct was wrongful.

A willful violation entails knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, but actual, subjective knowledge need not be demonstrated. It will suffice to show objectively what the alleged violator must have known of the facts based on reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances. For example, a person shown to have been responsible for performing an initial terminal air brake test that was not in fact performed would not be able to defend against a charge of a willful violation simply by claiming subjective ignorance of the fact that the test was not performed. If the facts, taken as a whole, demonstrated that the person was responsible for doing the test and had no reason to believe it

was performed by others, and if that person was shown to have acted with actual knowledge of or reckless disregard for the law requiring such a test, he or she would be subject to a civil penalty.

This definition of “willful” fits squarely within the parameters for willful acts laid out by Congress in the RSIA and its legislative history. Section 3(a) of the RSIA amends the Safety Act to provide:

For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor, under protest communicated to the supervisor. Such individual shall have the right to document such protest.

As FRA made clear when it recommended legislation granting individual penalty authority, a railroad employee should not have to choose between liability for a civil penalty or insubordination charges by the railroad. Where an employee (or even a supervisor) violates the law under a direct order from a supervisor, he or she does not do so of his or her free will. Thus, the act is not a voluntary one and, therefore, not willful under FRA’s definition of the word. Instead, the action of the person who has directly ordered the commission of the violation is itself a willful violation subjecting that person to a civil penalty. As one of the primary sponsors of the RSIA said on the Senate floor:

This amendment also seeks to clarify that the purpose of imposing civil penalties against individuals is to deter those who, of their free will, decide to violate the safety laws. The purpose is not to penalize those who are ordered to commit violations by those above them in the railroad chain of command. Rather, in such cases, the railroad official or supervisor who orders the others to violate the law would be liable for any violations his order caused to occur. One example is the movement of railroad cars or locomotives that are actually known to contain certain defective conditions. A train crew member who was ordered to move such equipment would not be liable for a civil penalty, and his participation in such movements could not be used against him in any disqualification proceeding brought by FRA.

133 Cong. Rec. S.15899 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1987) (remarks of Senator Exon).

* * *

The RSIA gives individuals the right to protest a direct order to violate the law and to document the protest. FRA will consider such protests and supporting documentation in deciding whether and against whom to cite civil penalties in a particular situation. Where such a direct order has been shown to have been given as alleged, and where such a protest is shown to have been communicated to the supervisor, the person or persons communicating it will have demonstrated their lack of willfulness. Any documentation of the protest will be considered along with all other evidence in determining whether the alleged order to violate was in fact given.

However, the absence of such a protest will not be viewed as warranting a presumption of willfulness on the part of the employee who might have communicated it. The statute says that a person who communicates such a protest shall be deemed not to have acted willfully; it does not say that a person who does not communicate such a protest will be deemed to have acted willfully. FRA would have to prove from all the pertinent facts that the employee willfully violated the law. Moreover, the absence of a protest would not be dispositive with regard to the willfulness of a supervisor who issued a direct order to violate the law. That is, the supervisor who allegedly issued an order to violate will not be able to rely on the employee's failure to protest the order as a complete defense. Rather, the issue will be whether, in view of all pertinent facts, the supervisor intentionally and voluntarily ordered the employee to commit an act that the supervisor knew would violate the law or acted with reckless disregard for whether it violated the law.

(emphasis added)

Thus, even before the Final Rule containing the GFC process was published in February, BLET members faced potential individual liability for willful violation of various FRA regulations published in 49 CFR Parts Part 218 (Railroad Operating Practices), 219 (Control of Alcohol and Drug), 220 (Railroad Communications), 221 (Rear End Marking Device-Passenger, Commuter and Freight Trains), 222 (Use of Locomotive Horns at Public Highway-Rail Grade Crossings), 232 (Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices), 238 (Passenger Equipment Safety Standards), and 240 (Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers). Included among the regulations for which a locomotive engineer could face potential individual liability for a willful violation are the five “cardinal sins” set forth in Part 240. The imposition of such civil penalties on individuals, however, has been exceedingly rare to date.

As noted above, both Congress and the FRA believed that railroad workers were protected from overzealous supervisors who order rules to be violated by this provision of the Federal Rail Safety Act:

A civil penalty under this subchapter may be imposed against an individual only for a willful violation. *An individual is deemed not to have committed a willful violation if the individual was following the direct order of a railroad carrier official or supervisor under protest communicated to the official or supervisor. The individual is entitled to document the protest.*

49 U.S.C. § 21304 (emphasis added).

The extent to which this law actually protected our members is questionable. Neither the statute nor FRA regulations prescribed any process by which the protest to which a worker is entitled could be lodged. Moreover, neither provided any means by which documentation of protests was to be achieved.

In April 2005, the FRA approached its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (“RSAC”) — comprised of representatives of dozens of industry stakeholders — with data indicating an alarming increase in human factor accidents, particularly on yard tracks. Driving this increase were accidents caused by mishandling of switches and derails, lack of point protection on shov-

ing moves, and equipment left in the fowl. FRA asked RSAC to approve creation of a Working Group to study the issue and consider federalizing certain operating procedures associated with these causes, and to look at federalizing procedures for handling main track switches, in the aftermath of the Graniteville, SC, collision and chlorine leak that killed nine — including Division 85 Secretary-Treasurer Brother Chris Seeling — three months earlier.

The Working Group, which included six BLET representatives, met for the first time in mid-July of 2005, and continued to meet nearly every month until the spring of last year. From the beginning of the process, FRA stated that one goal was to increase “accountability” for compliance with rules and regulations, which we correctly understood to mean adding the new procedures to the list of those for which BLET members could find themselves individually liable in the event of a willful violation. The carriers, on the other hand, merely wanted a regulation that required them to have operating rules, but without specifying details of how work processes were supposed to be completed.

The uniform position of the labor participants from all the unions was that:

- current operating rules were, in many cases, deliberately vague so that supervisors could cut operational corners to increase productivity, which caused many accidents that were unfairly blamed on crews;
- problems specifically caused by the implementation and use of remote control locomotives (“RCL”) in yard and switching service caused a significant number of accidents, and the RCL data were skewing the overall numbers;
- reductions in crew size coupled with the first wave of 60/30 retirees dropped the average experience level in yards to unsafe levels, with inadequate training in many cases; and
- if FRA was seriously thinking of exposing our members to even greater potential individual liability for willful violations of its regulations (1) the procedures to be federalized must be spelled out in detail so that everyone would know precisely what is required of them, and (2) a process was required in order to guarantee the statutory protections to protest and document management orders to violate FRA regulations, as provided in 49 U.S.C. Section 21304.

Our main thrust was that our members should no longer be caught in the middle, between a boss that will move anything at any time under any conditions, and a FRA inspector looking to write someone up for a violation. Everyone should know exactly what’s expected of them, and have the right to protect themselves from the potential of a civil penalty.

FRA ultimately decided that it did want the new rule included among those for which individual civil penalties could be levied.³ FRA also was persuaded by our arguments that it was fundamentally unfair to make our members liable unless they were provided the tools contemplated by law for their protection. FRA took the GFC concept, which has worked well among Roadway Workers for years, and tailored its processes to be consistent with the realities facing operating crafts every day. Unfortunately, FRA would not apply it across the board to all regulations at this time, and GFC is limited to just the new procedures set forth in Part 218, Subpart F.

As you might expect, the railroads went berserk after hearing our position, and after learning that we had persuaded FRA that our members needed to be protected. They threatened lawsuits to stop any GFC process and have, as a matter of fact, filed a Petition for Reconsideration to repeal this provision, which we have opposed. The carriers also swore up and down that we would bring the industry to a screeching halt by making frivolous challenges, which is being proven false one day at a time.

Initial reports we have received indicate that some — if not all — carriers are “selling” the GFC as a burden for our membership that was imposed by the FRA. Moreover, I find it curious that both CSXT and UP, if not others, are failing to tell our members that the GFC also may be used to challenge an order that the member in good faith believes violates one of the new Subpart F regulations, irrespective of whether it also violates an operating rule or not; we will take up that matter with FRA promptly.

In any event, the GFC is a burden for our members only if carriers insist on retaining vague operating rules and push our members to bend or break them. If you have reviewed the newly-federalized procedures, you already know that they are common sense requirements and nothing more than Railroading 101. The industry is the party responsible for the current regulation because of its erosion of safe work standards, coupled by pointing the finger of blame at us whenever its unsafe practices result in the inevitable accidents, incidents and injuries.

Without question, there will be some concern — and even management threats in some places — that carriers will target people who “don’t challenge when they should.” To a large degree, this is nothing different than the boss who tells you he’s going to make your life miserable if you try to enforce the Agreement. There is such strong management opposition to granting BLET members the right to protect themselves from FRA enforcement that I wouldn’t be surprised to see managers playing games with this process in an effort to undermine it. Remember, however, that a challenge starts with a management order to violate a FRA Subpart F regulation or a related operating rule.

Any GFC-related harassment must be thoroughly documented and reported. All of the affected unions will be monitoring how their members are being impacted, because the success of GFC will be measured in a reduction of accidents, and a reduction in discipline. I will be in Reno next week if anyone attending the WGCA or NASLBC wishes to discuss this issue further.

³ We strongly opposed that decision, and when new data became available after the Final Rule was published — showing an equally sharp decline in accident rates to below 1996 levels — six Organizations, including the BLET, filed a Petition for Reconsideration stating that the data FRA relied upon in making its decision have now been proven unreliable and that FRA should reverse its decision on individual civil penalties.

§ 218.97 Good faith challenge procedures.

(a) *Employee Responsibility.* An employee shall inform the railroad or employer whenever the employee has been directed to either take actions that would violate FRA regulations regarding the handling of equipment, switches, and fixed derails as required by this subpart, or to take actions that would violate the railroad's operating rules implementing the requirements of this subpart.

(b) *General procedures.* Each railroad or employer is responsible for the training of and compliance by its employees with the requirements of this subpart.

(1) Each railroad or employer shall adopt and implement written procedures which guarantee each employee the right to challenge in good faith whether the procedures that will be used to accomplish a specific task comply with the requirements of this subpart or any operating rule relied upon to fulfill the requirements of this subpart. Each railroad or employer's written procedures shall provide for prompt and equitable resolution of challenges made in accordance with this subpart.

(2) The written procedures required by this section shall indicate that the good faith challenge described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section is not intended to abridge any rights or remedies available to the employee under a collective bargaining agreement, or any Federal law including, but not limited to, 29 U.S.C. 651 *et seq.*, 6 U.S.C. 1142, or 49 U.S.C. 20109.

(3) Each affected employee shall be instructed on the written procedures required by this paragraph as part of the training prescribed by § 217.11 of this chapter.

(4) A copy of the current written procedures shall be provided to each affected employee and made available for inspection and copying by representatives of the FRA during normal business hours.

(c) The written procedures shall—

(1) Grant each employee the right to challenge any directive which, based on the employee's good faith determination, would cause the employee to violate any requirement of this subpart or any operating rule relied upon to fulfill the requirements of this subpart;

(2) Provide that the railroad or employer shall not require the challenging employee to comply with the directive until the challenge resulting from the good faith determination is resolved;

(3) Provide that the railroad or employer may require the challenging employee to perform tasks unrelated to the challenge until the challenge is resolved;

(4) Provide that the railroad or employer may direct an employee, other than the challenging employee, to perform the challenged task prior to the challenge being resolved as long as this other employee is informed of the challenge and does not also make a good faith determination that the challenged task would violate FRA regulations regarding the handling of equipment, switches, and fixed derails as required in this subpart, or a railroad's operating rules implementing the requirements of this subpart;

(5) Provide that a challenge may be resolved by:

(i) A railroad or employer officer's acceptance of the employee's request;

(ii) An employee's acceptance of the directive;

(iii) An employee's agreement to a compromise solution acceptable to the person issuing the directive; or

(iv) As further determined under paragraph (d) of this section.

(d) In the event that the challenge cannot be resolved because the person issuing the directive determines that the employee's challenge has not been made in good faith or there is no reasonable alternative to the direct order, the written procedures shall:

(1) Provide for immediate review by at least one officer of the railroad or employer, except for each railroad with less than 400,000 total employee work hours annually. This immediate review shall:

(i) Not be conducted by the person issuing the challenged directive, or that person's subordinate; and

(ii) Provide that a challenge may be resolved by using the same options available for resolving the challenge as the initial officer as well as the option described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, except that the reviewing officer's decision shall not be subject to further immediate review, unless provided for in the railroad's or employer's written procedures;

(2) Provide that if the officer making the railroad's or employer's final decision concludes that the challenged directive would not cause the employee to violate any requirement of this subpart or the railroad's or employer's operating rule relied upon to fulfill the requirements of this subpart and directs the employee to perform the challenged directive, the officer shall further explain to the employee that Federal law may protect the employee from retaliation if the employee refuses to do the work and if the employee's refusal is a lawful, good faith act;

(3) Provide that the employee be afforded an opportunity to document electronically or in writing any protest to the railroad or employer's final decision before the tour of duty is complete. The employee shall be afforded the opportunity to retain a copy of the protest;

(4) Provide that the employee, upon written request, has a right to further review by a designated railroad or employer officer, within 30 days after the expiration of the month during which the challenge occurred, for the purpose of verifying the proper application of the regulation, law, procedure or rule in question. The verification decision shall be made in writing to the employee.

(e) *Recordkeeping and record retention.*

(1) A copy of the written procedures required by this section shall be retained at the employer or railroad's system headquarters and at each division headquarters, and made available to representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours.

(2) A copy of any written good faith challenge verification decision, made in accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this section, shall be retained at the employer or railroad's system headquarters and at the division headquarters to which the employee was working when the challenge was initiated, and made available to representatives of the FRA for inspection and copying during normal business hours for at least one calendar year after expiration of the year during which the decision was issued.

(3) Each employer or railroad to which this subpart applies is authorized to retain by electronic recordkeeping the information prescribed in this subpart in accordance with the electronic recordkeeping standards set forth in § 217.9(g)(1) through (5) of this chapter.

APPENDIX A TO PART 209—STATEMENT OF AGENCY POLICY CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY LAWS

The Federal Railroad Administration (“fra”) enforces the federal railroad safety statutes under delegation from the Secretary of Transportation. See 49 CFR 1.49 (c), (d), (f), (g), and (m). Those statutes include the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (“Safety Act”), 45 U.S.C. 421 *et seq.*, and a group of statutes enacted prior to 1970 referred to collectively herein as the “older safety statutes”: The Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C. 1-16; the Locomotive Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. 22-34; the Accident Reports Act, 45 U.S.C. 38-43; the Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. 61-64b; and the Signal Inspection Act, 49 App. U.S.C. 26. Regulations implementing those statutes are found at 49 CFR parts 213 through 236. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-342, enacted June 22, 1988) (“RSIA”) raised the maximum civil penalties available under the railroad safety laws and made individuals liable for willful violations of those laws. FRA also enforces the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 App. U.S.C. 1801 *et seq.*, as it pertains to the shipment or transportation of hazardous materials by rail.

THE CIVIL PENALTY PROCESS

The front lines in the civil penalty process are the FRA safety inspectors: FRA employs over 300 inspectors, and their work is supplemented by approximately 100 inspectors from states participating in enforcement of the federal rail safety laws. These inspectors routinely inspect the equipment, track, and signal systems and observe the operations of the nation’s railroads. They also investigate hundreds of complaints filed annually by those alleging noncompliance with the laws. When inspection or complaint investigation reveals noncompliance with the laws, each noncomplying condition or action is listed on an inspection report. Where the inspector determines that the best method of promoting compliance is to assess a civil penalty, he or she prepares a violation report, which is essentially a recommendation to the FRA Office of Chief Counsel to assess a penalty based on the evidence provided in or with the report.

In determining which instances of non-compliance merit penalty recommendations, the inspector considers:

- (1) The inherent seriousness of the condition or action;
- (2) The kind and degree of potential safety hazard the condition or action poses in light of the immediate factual situation;
- (3) Any actual harm to persons or property already caused by the condition or action;

(4) The offending person’s (*i.e.*, railroad’s or individual’s) general level of current compliance as revealed by the inspection as a whole;

(5) The person’s recent history of compliance with the relevant set of regulations, especially at the specific location or division of the railroad involved;

(6) Whether a remedy other than a civil penalty (ranging from a warning on up to an emergency order) is more appropriate under all of the facts; and

(7) Such other factors as the immediate circumstances make relevant.

The civil penalty recommendation is reviewed at the regional level by a specialist in the subject matter involved, who requires correction of any technical flaws and determines whether the recommendation is consistent with national enforcement policy in similar circumstances. Guidance on that policy in close cases is sometimes sought from Office of Safety headquarters. Violation reports that are technically and legally sufficient and in accord with FRA policy are sent from the regional office to the Office of Chief Counsel.

The exercise of this discretion at the field and regional levels is a vital part of the enforcement process, ensuring that the exacting and time-consuming civil penalty process is used to address those situations most in need of the deterrent effect of penalties. FRA exercises that discretion with regard to individual violators in the same manner it does with respect to railroads.

The Office of Chief Counsel’s Safety Division reviews each violation report it receives from the regional offices for legal sufficiency and assesses penalties based on those allegations that survive that review. Historically, the Division has returned to the regional offices less than five percent of the reports submitted in a given year, often with a request for further work and resubmission.

Where the violation was committed by a railroad, penalties are assessed by issuance of a penalty demand letter that summarizes the claims, encloses the violation report with a copy of all evidence on which FRA is relying in making its initial charge, and explains that the railroad may pay in full or submit, orally or in writing, information concerning any defenses or mitigating factors. The railroad safety statutes, in conjunction with the Federal Claims Collection Act, authorize FRA to adjust or compromise the initial penalty claims based on a wide variety of mitigating factors. This system permits the efficient collection of civil penalties in amounts that fit the actual offense without resort to time-consuming and expensive litigation. Over its history, FRA has had to request that the Attorney General bring suit to collect a penalty on only a very few occasions.

Once penalties have been assessed, the railroad is given a reasonable amount of time to investigate the charges. Larger railroads usually make their case before FRA in an informal conference covering a number of case files that have been issued and investigated since the previous conference. Thus, in terms of the negotiating time of both sides, economies of scale are achieved that would be impossible if each case were negotiated separately. The settlement conferences, held either in Washington or another mutually agreed on location, include technical experts from both FRA and the railroad as well as lawyers for both parties. In addition to allowing the two sides to make their cases for the relative merits of the various claims, these conferences also provide a forum for addressing current compliance problems. Smaller railroads usually prefer to handle negotiations through the mail or over the telephone, often on a single case at a time. Once the two sides have agreed to an amount on each case, that agreement is put in writing and a check is submitted to FRA's accounting division covering the full amount agreed on.

Cases brought under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 App. U.S.C. 1801 *et seq.*, are, due to certain statutory requirements, handled under more formal administrative procedures. See 49 CFR part 209, subpart B.

CIVIL PENALTIES AGAINST INDIVIDUALS

The RSIA amended the penalty provisions of the railroad safety statutes to make them applicable to any "person (including a railroad and any manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad)" who fails to comply with the regulations or statutes. *E.g.*, section 3 of the RSIA, amending section 209 of the Safety Act. However, the RSIA also provided that civil penalties may be assessed against individuals "only for willful violations."

Thus, any individual meeting the statutory description of "person" is liable for a civil penalty for a willful violation of, or for willfully causing the violation of, the safety statutes or regulations. Of course, as has traditionally been the case with respect to acts of noncompliance by railroads, the FRA field inspector exercises discretion in deciding which situations call for a civil penalty assessment as the best method of ensuring compliance. The inspector has a range of options, including an informal warning, a more formal warning letter issued by the Safety Division of the Office of Chief Counsel, recommendation of a civil penalty assessment, recommendation of disqualification or suspension from safety-sensitive service, or, under the most extreme circumstances, recommendation of emergency action.

The threshold question in any alleged violation by an individual will be whether that

violation was "willful." (Note that section 3(a) of the RSIA, which authorizes suspension or disqualification of a person whose violation of the safety laws has shown him or her to be unfit for safety-sensitive service, does not require a showing of willfulness. Regulations implementing that provision are found at 49 CFR part 209, subpart D.) FRA proposed this standard of liability when, in 1987, it originally proposed a statutory revision authorizing civil penalties against individuals. FRA believed then that it would be too harsh a system to collect fines from individuals on a strict liability basis, as the safety statutes permit FRA to do with respect to railroads. FRA also believed that even a reasonable care standard (*e.g.*, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act's standard for civil penalty liability, 49 U.S.C. 1809(a)) would subject individuals to civil penalties in more situations than the record warranted. Instead, FRA wanted the authority to penalize those who violate the safety laws through a purposeful act of free will.

Thus, FRA considers a "willful" violation to be one that is an intentional, voluntary act committed either with knowledge of the relevant law or reckless disregard for whether the act violated the requirements of the law. Accordingly, neither a showing of evil purpose (as is sometimes required in certain criminal cases) nor actual knowledge of the law is necessary to prove a willful violation, but a level of culpability higher than negligence must be demonstrated. See *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston*, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); *Brock v. Morello Bros. Constr., Inc.* 809 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1987); and *Donovan v. Williams Enterprises, Inc.*, 744 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Reckless disregard for the requirements of the law can be demonstrated in many ways. Evidence that a person was trained on or made aware of the specific rule involved—or, as is more likely, its corresponding industry equivalent—would suffice. Moreover, certain requirements are so obviously fundamental to safe railroading (*e.g.*, the prohibition against disabling an automatic train control device) that any violation of them, regardless of whether the person was actually aware of the prohibition, should be seen as reckless disregard of the law. See *Brock, supra*, 809 F.2d 164. Thus, a lack of subjective knowledge of the law is no impediment to a finding of willfulness. If it were, a mere denial of the content of the particular regulation would provide a defense. Having proposed use of the word "willful," FRA believes it was not intended to insulate from liability those who simply claim—contrary to the established facts of the case—they had no reason to believe their conduct was wrongful.

A willful violation entails knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, but actual, subjective knowledge need not be demonstrated. It will suffice to show objectively what the alleged violator must have known of the facts based on reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances. For example, a person shown to have been responsible for performing an initial terminal air brake test that was not in fact performed would not be able to defend against a charge of a willful violation simply by claiming subjective ignorance of the fact that the test was not performed. If the facts, taken as a whole, demonstrated that the person was responsible for doing the test and had no reason to believe it was performed by others, and if that person was shown to have acted with actual knowledge of or reckless disregard for the law requiring such a test, he or she would be subject to a civil penalty.

This definition of "willful" fits squarely within the parameters for willful acts laid out by Congress in the RSIA and its legislative history. Section 3(a) of the RSIA amends the Safety Act to provide:

For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor, under protest communicated to the supervisor. Such individual shall have the right to document such protest.

As FRA made clear when it recommended legislation granting individual penalty authority, a railroad employee should not have to choose between liability for a civil penalty or insubordination charges by the railroad. Where an employee (or even a supervisor) violates the law under a direct order from a supervisor, he or she does not do so of his or her free will. Thus, the act is not a voluntary one and, therefore, not willful under FRA's definition of the word. Instead, the action of the person who has directly ordered the commission of the violation is itself a willful violation subjecting that person to a civil penalty. As one of the primary sponsors of the RSIA said on the Senate floor:

This amendment also seeks to clarify that the purpose of imposing civil penalties against individuals is to deter those who, of their free will, decide to violate the safety laws. The purpose is not to penalize those who are ordered to commit violations by those above them in the railroad chain of command. Rather, in such cases, the railroad official or supervisor who orders the others to violate the law would be liable for any violations his order caused to occur. One example is the movement of railroad cars or locomotives that are actually known to contain certain defective conditions. A train crew member who was ordered to move such equipment would not be liable for a civil

penalty, and his participation in such movements could not be used against him in any disqualification proceeding brought by FRA. 133 Cong. Rec. S.15899 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1987) (remarks of Senator Exon).

It should be noted that FRA will apply the same definition of "willful" to corporate acts as is set out here with regard to individual violations. Although railroads are strictly liable for violations of the railroad safety laws and deemed to have knowledge of those laws, FRA's penalty schedules contain, for each regulation, a separate amount earmarked as the initial assessment for willful violations. Where FRA seeks such an extraordinary penalty from a railroad, it will apply the definition of "willful" set forth above. In such cases—as in all civil penalty cases brought by FRA—the aggregate knowledge and actions of the railroad's managers, supervisors, employees, and other agents will be imputed to the railroad. Thus, in situations that FRA decides warrant a civil penalty based on a willful violation, FRA will have the option of citing the railroad and/or one or more of the individuals involved. In cases against railroads other than those in which FRA alleges willfulness or in which a particular regulation imposes a special standard, the principles of strict liability and presumed knowledge of the law will continue to apply.

The RSIA gives individuals the right to protest a direct order to violate the law and to document the protest. FRA will consider such protests and supporting documentation in deciding whether and against whom to cite civil penalties in a particular situation. Where such a direct order has been shown to have been given as alleged, and where such a protest is shown to have been communicated to the supervisor, the person or persons communicating it will have demonstrated their lack of willfulness. Any documentation of the protest will be considered along with all other evidence in determining whether the alleged order to violate was in fact given.

However, the absence of such a protest will not be viewed as warranting a presumption of willfulness on the part of the employee who might have communicated it. The statute says that a person who communicates such a protest shall be deemed not to have acted willfully; it does not say that a person who does not communicate such a protest will be deemed to have acted willfully. FRA would have to prove from all the pertinent facts that the employee willfully violated the law. Moreover, the absence of a protest would not be dispositive with regard to the willfulness of a supervisor who issued a direct order to violate the law. That is, the supervisor who allegedly issued an order to violate will not be able to rely on the employee's failure to protest the order as a complete defense. Rather, the issue will be

whether, in view of all pertinent facts, the supervisor intentionally and voluntarily ordered the employee to commit an act that the supervisor knew would violate the law or acted with reckless disregard for whether it violated the law.

FRA exercises the civil penalty authority over individuals through informal procedures very similar to those used with respect to railroad violations. However, FRA varies those procedures somewhat to account for differences that may exist between the railroad's ability to defend itself against a civil penalty charge and an individual's ability to do so. First, when the field inspector decides that an individual's actions warrant a civil penalty recommendation and drafts a violation report, the inspector or the regional director informs the individual in writing of his or her intention to seek assessment of a civil penalty and the fact that a violation report has been transmitted to the Office of Chief Counsel. This ensures that the individual has the opportunity to seek counsel, preserve documents, or take any other necessary steps to aid his or her defense at the earliest possible time.

Second, if the Office of Chief Counsel concludes that the case is meritorious and issues a penalty demand letter, that letter makes clear that FRA encourages discussion, through the mail, over the telephone or in person, of any defenses or mitigating factors the individual may wish to raise. That letter also advises the individual that he or she may wish to obtain representation by an attorney and/or labor representative. During the negotiation stage, FRA considers each case individually on its merits and gives due weight to whatever information the alleged violator provides.

Finally, in the unlikely event that a settlement cannot be reached, FRA sends the individual a letter warning of its intention to request that the Attorney General sue for the initially proposed amount and giving the person a sufficient interval (*e.g.*, 30 days) to decide if that is the only alternative.

FRA believes that the intent of Congress would be violated if individuals who agree to pay a civil penalty or are ordered to do so by a court are indemnified for that penalty by the railroad or another institution (such as a labor organization). Congress intended that the penalties have a deterrent effect on individual behavior that would be lessened, if not eliminated, by such indemnification.

Although informal, face-to-face meetings are encouraged during the negotiation of a civil penalty charge, the RSIA does not require that FRA give individuals or railroads the opportunity for a formal, trial-type administrative hearing as part of the civil penalty process. FRA does not provide that opportunity because such administrative hearings would be likely to add significantly to the costs an individual would have to bear in

defense of a safety claim (and also to FRA's enforcement expenses) without shedding any more light on what resolution of the matter is fair than would the informal procedures set forth here. Of course, should an individual or railroad decide not to settle, that person would be entitled to a trial *de novo* when FRA, through the Attorney General, sued to collect the penalty in the appropriate United States district court.

PENALTY SCHEDULES; ASSESSMENT OF MAXIMUM PENALTIES

As recommended by the Department of Transportation in its initial proposal for rail safety legislative revisions in 1987, the RSIA raised the maximum civil penalties for violations of the safety regulations. Under the Hours of Service Act, the penalty was changed from a flat \$500 to a penalty of "up to \$1,000, as the Secretary of Transportation deems reasonable." Under all the other statutes, the maximum penalty was raised from \$2,500 to \$10,000 per violation, except that "where a grossly negligent violation or pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury," a penalty of up to \$20,000 per violation may be assessed.

The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992 (RSERA) increased the maximum penalty from \$1,000 to \$10,000 and in some cases, \$20,000 for a violation of the Hours of Service Laws, making these penalty amounts uniform with those of FRA's other regulatory provisions. RSERA also increased the minimum civil monetary penalty from \$250 to \$500 for all of FRA's regulatory provisions. The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-410, 104 Stat. 890, note, as amended by Section 31001(s)(1) of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 Public Law 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-373, April 26, 1996 required that agencies adjust by regulation each maximum civil monetary penalty within the agency's jurisdiction for inflation and make subsequent adjustments once every four years after the initial adjustment. Accordingly, FRA's maximum civil monetary penalties have been adjusted.

FRA's traditional practice has been to issue penalty schedules assigning to each particular regulation specific dollar amounts for initial penalty assessments. The schedule (except where issued after notice and an opportunity for comment) constitutes a statement of agency policy, and is ordinarily issued as an appendix to the relevant part of the Code of Federal Regulations. For each regulation, the schedule shows two amounts within the \$550 to \$11,000 range in separate columns, the first for ordinary violations, the second for willful violations (whether committed by railroads or individuals). In

one instance—part 231—the schedule refers to sections of the relevant FRA defect code rather than to sections of the CFR text. Of course, the defect code, which is simply a re-organized version of the CFR text used by FRA to facilitate computerization of inspection data, is substantively identical to the CFR text.

The schedule amounts are meant to provide guidance as to FRA's policy in predictable situations, not to bind FRA from using the full range of penalty authority where extraordinary circumstances warrant. The Senate report on the bill that became the RSIA stated:

It is expected that the Secretary would act expeditiously to set penalty levels commensurate with the severity of the violations, with imposition of the maximum penalty reserved for violation of any regulation where warranted by exceptional circumstances. S. Rep. No. 100-153, 10th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1987).

Accordingly, under each of the schedules (ordinarily in a footnote), and regardless of the fact that a lesser amount might be shown in both columns of the schedule, FRA reserves the right to assess the statutory maximum penalty of up to \$27,000 per violation where a grossly negligent violation has created an imminent hazard of death or injury. This authority to assess a penalty for a single violation above \$11,000 and up to \$27,000 is used only in very exceptional cases to penalize egregious behavior. Where FRA avails itself of this right to use the higher penalties in place of the schedule amount it so indicates in its penalty demand letter.

THE EXTENT AND EXERCISE OF FRA'S SAFETY JURISDICTION

The Safety Act and, as amended by the RSIA, the older safety statutes apply to "railroads." Section 202(e) of the Safety Act defines railroad as follows:

The term "railroad" as used in this title means all forms of non-highway ground transportation that run on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including (1) commuter or other short-haul rail passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area, as well as any commuter rail service which was operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation as of January 1, 1979, and (2) high speed ground transportation systems that connect metropolitan areas, without regard to whether they use new technologies not associated with traditional railroads. Such term does not include rapid transit operations within an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad system of transportation.

Prior to 1988, the older safety statutes had applied only to common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by rail. The Safety Act, by contrast, was intended to reach as far as the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (i.e., to all railroads that affect interstate commerce) rather than be limited

to common carriers actually engaged in interstate commerce. In reporting out the bill that became the 1970 Safety Act, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated:

The Secretary's authority to regulate extends to all areas of railroad safety. This legislation is intended to encompass all those means of rail transportation as are commonly included within the term. Thus, "railroad" is not limited to the confines of "common carrier by railroad" as that language is defined in the Interstate Commerce Act.

H.R. Rep. No. 91-1194, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 16 (1970).

FRA's jurisdiction was bifurcated until, in 1988, the RSIA amended the older safety statutes to make them coextensive with the Safety Act by making them applicable to railroads and incorporating the Safety Act's definition of the term (*e.g.*, 45 U.S.C. 16, as amended). The RSIA also made clear that FRA's safety jurisdiction is not confined to entities using traditional railroad technology. The new definition of "railroad" emphasized that all non-highway high speed ground transportation systems—regardless of technology used—would be considered railroads.

Thus, with the exception of self-contained urban rapid transit systems, FRA's statutory jurisdiction extends to all entities that can be construed as railroads by virtue of their providing non-highway ground transportation over rails or electromagnetic guideways, and will extend to future railroads using other technologies not yet in use. For policy reasons, however, FRA does not exercise jurisdiction under all of its regulations to the full extent permitted by statute. Based on its knowledge of where the safety problems were occurring at the time of its regulatory action and its assessment of the practical limitations on its role, FRA has, in each regulatory context, decided that the best option was to regulate something less than the total universe of railroads.

For example, all of FRA's regulations exclude from their reach railroads whose entire operations are confined to an industrial installation (*i.e.*, "plant railroads"), such as those in steel mills that do not go beyond the plant's boundaries. *E.g.*, 49 CFR 225.3(a)(1) (accident reporting regulations). Some rules exclude passenger operations that are not part of the general railroad system (such as some tourist railroads) only if they meet the definition of "insular." *E.g.*, 49 CFR 225.3(a)(3) (accident reporting) and 234.3(c) (grade crossing signal safety). Other regulations exclude not only plant railroads but all other railroads that are not operated as a part of, or over the lines of, the general railroad system of transportation. *E.g.*, 49 CFR 214.3 (railroad workplace safety).

By "general railroad system of transportation," FRA refers to the network of standard gage track over which goods may be transported throughout the nation and passengers may travel between cities and within metropolitan and suburban areas. Much of this network is interconnected, so that a rail vehicle can travel across the nation without leaving the system. However, mere physical connection to the system does not bring trackage within it. For example, trackage within an industrial installation that is connected to the network only by a switch for the receipt of shipments over the system is not a part of the system.

Moreover, portions of the network may lack a physical connection but still be part of the system by virtue of the nature of operations that take place there. For example, the Alaska Railroad is not physically connected to the rest of the general system but is part of it. The Alaska Railroad exchanges freight cars with other railroads by car float and exchanges passengers with interstate carriers as part of the general flow of interstate commerce. Similarly, an intercity high speed rail system with its own right of way would be part of the general system although not physically connected to it. The presence on a rail line of any of these types of railroad operations is a sure indication that such trackage is part of the general system: the movement of freight cars in trains outside the confines of an industrial installation, the movement of intercity passenger trains, or the movement of commuter trains within a metropolitan or suburban area. Urban rapid transit operations are ordinarily not part of the general system, but may have sufficient connections to that system to warrant exercise of FRA's jurisdiction (*see* discussion of passenger operations, below). Tourist railroad operations are not inherently part of the general system and, unless operated over the lines of that system, are subject to few of FRA's regulations.

The boundaries of the general system are not static. For example, a portion of the system may be purchased for the exclusive use of a single private entity and all connections, save perhaps a switch for receiving shipments, severed. Depending on the nature of the operations, this could remove that portion from the general system. The system may also grow, as with the establishment of intercity service on a brand new line. However, the same trackage cannot be both inside and outside of the general system depending upon the time of day. If trackage is part of the general system, restricting a certain type of traffic over that trackage to a particular portion of the day does not change the nature of the line—it remains the general system.

Of course, even where a railroad operates outside the general system, other railroads that are definitely part of that system may

have occasion to enter the first railroad's property (*e.g.*, a major railroad goes into a chemical or auto plant to pick up or set out cars). In such cases, the railroad that is part of the general system remains part of that system while inside the installation; thus, all of its activities are covered by FRA's regulations during that period. The plant railroad itself, however, does not get swept into the general system by virtue of the other railroad's activity, except to the extent it is liable, as the track owner, for the condition of its track over which the other railroad operates during its incursion into the plant. Of course, in the opposite situation, where the plant railroad itself operates beyond the plant boundaries on the general system, it becomes a railroad with respect to those particular operations, during which its equipment, crew, and practices would be subject to FRA's regulations.

In some cases, the plant railroad leases track immediately adjacent to its plant from the general system railroad. Assuming such a lease provides for, and actual practice entails, the exclusive use of that trackage by the plant railroad and the general system railroad for purposes of moving only cars shipped to or from the plant, the lease would remove the plant railroad's operations on that trackage from the general system for purposes of FRA's regulations, as it would make that trackage part and parcel of the industrial installation. (As explained above, however, the track itself would have to meet FRA's standards if a general system railroad operated over it. *See* 49 CFR 213.5 for the rules on how an owner of track may assign responsibility for it.) A lease or practice that permitted other types of movements by general system railroads on that trackage would, of course, bring it back into the general system, as would operations by the plant railroad indicating it was moving cars on such trackage for other than its own purposes (*e.g.*, moving cars to neighboring industries for hire).

FRA exercises jurisdiction over tourist, scenic, and excursion railroad operations whether or not they are conducted on the general railroad system. There are two exceptions: (1) operations of less than 24-inch gage (which, historically, have never been considered railroads under the Federal railroad safety laws); and (2) operations that are off the general system and "insular" (defined below).

Insularity is an issue only with regard to tourist operations over trackage outside of the general system used exclusively for such operations. FRA considers a tourist operation to be insular if its operations are limited to a separate enclave in such a way that there is no reasonable expectation that the safety of any member of the public—except a business guest, a licensee of the tourist operation or an affiliated entity, or a

trespasser would be affected by the operation. A tourist operation will not be considered insular if one or more of the following exists on its line:

- A public highway-rail crossing that is in use;
- An at-grade rail crossing that is in use;
- A bridge over a public road or waters used for commercial navigation; or
- A common corridor with a railroad, *i.e.*, its operations are within 30 feet of those of any railroad.

When tourist operations are conducted on the general system, FRA exercises jurisdiction over them, and all of FRA's pertinent regulations apply to those operations unless a waiver is granted or a rule specifically excepts such operations (*e.g.*, the passenger equipment safety standards contain an exception for these operations, 49 CFR 238.3(c)(3), even if conducted on the general system). When a tourist operation is conducted only on track used exclusively for that purpose it is not part of the general system. The fact that a tourist operation has a switch that connects it to the general system does not make the tourist operation part of the general system if the tourist trains do not enter the general system and the general system railroad does not use the tourist operation's trackage for any purpose other than delivering or picking up shipments to or from the tourist operation itself.

If a tourist operation off the general system is insular, FRA does not exercise jurisdiction over it, and none of FRA's rules apply. If, however, such an operation is not insular, FRA exercises jurisdiction over the operation, and some of FRA's rules (*i.e.*, those that specifically apply beyond the general system to such operations) will apply. For example, FRA's rules on accident reporting, steam locomotives, and grade crossing signals apply to these non-insular tourist operations (*see* 49 CFR 225.3, 230.2 and 234.3), as do all of FRA's procedural rules (49 CFR parts 209, 211, and 216) and the Federal railroad safety statutes themselves.

In drafting safety rules, FRA has a specific obligation to consider financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to tourist operations. 49 U.S.C. 20103(f). Accordingly, FRA is careful to consider those factors in determining whether any particular rule will apply to tourist operations. Therefore, although FRA asserts jurisdiction quite broadly over these operations, we work to ensure that the rules we issue are appropriate to their somewhat special circumstances.

It is important to note that FRA's exercise of its regulatory authority on a given matter does not preclude it from subsequently amending its regulations on that subject to bring in railroads originally excluded. More important, the self-imposed restrictions on FRA's exercise of regulatory authority in no

way constrain its exercise of emergency order authority under section 203 of the Safety Act. That authority was designed to deal with imminent hazards not dealt with by existing regulations and/or so dangerous as to require immediate, *ex parte* action on the government's part. Thus, a railroad excluded from the reach of any of FRA's regulations is fully within the reach of FRA's emergency order authority, which is coextensive with FRA's statutory jurisdiction over all railroads.

FRA'S POLICY ON JURISDICTION OVER PASSENGER OPERATIONS

Under the Federal railroad safety laws, FRA has jurisdiction over all railroads except "rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad system of transportation." 49 U.S.C. 20102. Within the limits imposed by this authority, FRA exercises jurisdiction over all railroad passenger operations, regardless of the equipment they use, unless FRA has specifically stated below an exception to its exercise of jurisdiction for a particular type of operation. This policy is stated in general terms and does not change the reach of any particular regulation under its applicability section. That is, while FRA may generally assert jurisdiction over a type of operation here, a particular regulation may exclude that kind of operation from its reach. Therefore, this statement should be read in conjunction with the applicability sections of all of FRA's regulations.

INTERCITY PASSENGER OPERATIONS

FRA exercises jurisdiction over all intercity passenger operations. Because of the nature of the service they provide, standard gage intercity operations are all considered part of the general railroad system, even if not physically connected to other portions of the system. Other intercity passenger operations that are not standard gage (such as a magnetic levitation system) are within FRA's jurisdiction even though not part of the general system.

COMMUTER OPERATIONS

FRA exercises jurisdiction over all commuter operations. Congress apparently intended that FRA do so when it enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, and made that intention very clear in the 1982 and 1988 amendments to that act. FRA has attempted to follow that mandate consistently. A commuter system's connection to other railroads is not relevant under the rail safety statutes. In fact, FRA considers commuter railroads to be part of the general railroad system regardless of such connections.

FRA will presume that an operation is a commuter railroad if there is a statutory determination that Congress considers a particular service to be commuter rail. For example, in the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, 45 U.S.C. 1104(3), Congress listed specific commuter authorities. If that presumption does not apply, and the operation does not meet the description of a system that is presumptively urban rapid transit (see below), FRA will determine whether a system is commuter or urban rapid transit by analyzing all of the system's pertinent facts. FRA is likely to consider an operation to be a commuter railroad if:

- The system serves an urban area, its suburbs, and more distant outlying communities in the greater metropolitan area,
- The system's primary function is moving passengers back and forth between their places of employment in the city and their homes within the greater metropolitan area, and moving passengers from station to station within the immediate urban area is, at most, an incidental function, and
- The vast bulk of the system's trains are operated in the morning and evening peak periods with few trains at other hours.

Examples of commuter railroads include Metra and the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District in the Chicago area; Virginia Railway Express and MARC in the Washington area; and Metro-North, the Long Island Railroad, New Jersey Transit, and the Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH) in the New York area.

OTHER SHORT HAUL PASSENGER SERVICE

The federal railroad safety statutes give FRA authority over "commuter or other short-haul railroad passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area." 49 U.S.C. 20102. This means that, in addition to commuter service, there are other short-haul types of service that Congress intended that FRA reach. For example, a passenger system designed primarily to move intercity travelers from a downtown area to an airport, or from an airport to a resort area, would be one that does not have the transportation of commuters within a metropolitan area as its primary purpose. FRA would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over such a system as "other short-haul service" unless it meets the definition of urban rapid transit and is not connected in a significant way to the general system.

URBAN RAPID TRANSIT OPERATIONS

One type of short-haul passenger service requires special treatment under the safety statutes: "rapid transit operations in an urban area." Only these operations are excluded from FRA's jurisdiction, and only if they are "not connected to the general railroad system." FRA will presume that an op-

eration is an urban rapid transit operation if the system is not presumptively a commuter railroad (see discussion above) the operation is a subway or elevated operation with its own track system on which no other railroad may operate, has no highway-rail crossings at grade, operates within an urban area, and moves passengers from station to station within the urban area as one of its major functions.

Where neither the commuter railroad nor urban rapid transit presumptions applies, FRA will look at all of the facts pertinent to a particular operation to determine its proper characterization. FRA is likely to consider an operation to be urban rapid transit if:

- The operation serves an urban area (and may also serve its suburbs),
- Moving passengers from station to station within the urban boundaries is a major function of the system and there are multiple station stops within the city for that purpose (such an operation could still have the transportation of commuters as one of its major functions without being considered a commuter railroad), and
- The system provides frequent train service even outside the morning and evening peak periods.

Examples of urban rapid transit systems include the Metro in the Washington, D.C. area, CTA in Chicago, and the subway systems in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. The type of equipment used by such a system is not determinative of its status. However, the kinds of vehicles ordinarily associated with street railways, trolleys, subways, and elevated railways are the types of vehicles most often used for urban rapid transit operations.

FRA can exercise jurisdiction over a rapid transit operation only if it is connected to the general railroad system, but need not exercise jurisdiction over every such operation that is so connected. FRA is aware of several different ways that rapid transit operations can be connected to the general system. Our policy on the exercise of jurisdiction will depend upon the nature of the connection(s). In general, a connection that involves operation of transit equipment as a part of, or over the lines of, the general system will trigger FRA's exercise of jurisdiction. Below, we review some of the more common types of connections and their effect on the agency's exercise of jurisdiction. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of connections.

RAPID TRANSIT CONNECTIONS SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER FRA'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Certain types of connections to the general railroad system will cause FRA to exercise jurisdiction over the rapid transit line *to the extent it is connected*. FRA will exercise jurisdiction over the portion of a rapid transit operation that is conducted as a part of or over

the lines of the general system. For example, rapid transit operations are conducted on the lines of the general system where the rapid transit operation and other railroad use the same track. FRA will exercise its jurisdiction over the operations conducted on the general system. In situations involving joint use of the same track, it does not matter that the rapid transit operation occupies the track only at times when the freight, commuter, or intercity passenger railroad that shares the track is not operating. While such time separation could provide the basis for waiver of certain of FRA's rules (see 49 CFR part 211), it does not mean that FRA will not exercise jurisdiction. However, FRA will exercise jurisdiction over only the portions of the rapid transit operation that are conducted on the general system. For example, a rapid transit line that operates over the general system for a portion of its length but has significant portions of street railway that are not used by conventional railroads would be subject to FRA's rules only with respect to the general system portion. The remaining portions would not be subject to FRA's rules. If the non-general system portions of the rapid transit line are considered a "rail fixed guideway system" under 49 CFR Part 659, those rules, issued by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), would apply to them.

Another connection to the general system sufficient to warrant FRA's exercise of jurisdiction is a railroad crossing at grade where the rapid transit operation and other railroad cross each other's tracks. In this situation, FRA will exercise its jurisdiction sufficiently to assure safe operations over the at-grade railroad crossing. FRA will also exercise jurisdiction to a limited extent over a rapid transit operation that, while not operated on the same tracks as the conventional railroad, is connected to the general system by virtue of operating in a shared right-of-way involving joint control of trains. For example, if a rapid transit line and freight railroad were to operate over a movable bridge and were subject to the same authority concerning its use (*e.g.*, the same tower operator controls trains of both operations), FRA will exercise jurisdiction in a manner sufficient to ensure safety at this point of connection. Also, where transit operations share highway-rail grade crossings with conventional railroads, FRA expects both systems to observe its signal rules. For example, FRA expects both railroads to observe the provision of its rule on grade crossing signals that requires prompt reports of warning system malfunctions. See 49 CFR part 234. FRA believes these connections present sufficient intermingling of the rapid transit and general system operations to pose significant hazards to one or both operations and, in the case of highway-rail grade crossings, to the motoring public. The safety of highway users

of highway-rail grade crossings can best be protected if they get the same signals concerning the presence of any rail vehicles at the crossing and if they can react the same way to all rail vehicles.

RAPID TRANSIT CONNECTIONS NOT SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER FRA'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Although FRA could exercise jurisdiction over a rapid transit operation based on any connection it has to the general railroad system, FRA believes there are certain connections that are too minimal to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. For example, a rapid transit system that has a switch for receiving shipments from the general system railroad is not one over which FRA would assert jurisdiction. This assumes that the switch is used only for that purpose. In that case, any entry onto the rapid transit line by the freight railroad would be for a very short distance and solely for the purpose of dropping off or picking up cars. In this situation, the rapid transit line is in the same situation as any shipper or consignee; without this sort of connection, it cannot receive or offer goods by rail.

Mere use of a common right-of-way or corridor in which the conventional railroad and rapid transit operation do not share any means of train control, have a rail crossing at grade, or operate over the same highway-rail grade crossings would not trigger FRA's exercise of jurisdiction. In this context, the presence of intrusion detection devices to alert one or both carriers to incursions by the other one would not be considered a means of common train control. These common rights of way are often designed so that the two systems function completely independently of each other. FRA and FTA will coordinate with rapid transit agencies and railroads wherever there are concerns about sufficient intrusion detection and related safety measures designed to avoid a collision between rapid transit trains and conventional equipment.

Where these very minimal connections exist, FRA will not exercise jurisdiction unless and until an emergency situation arises involving such a connection, which is a very unlikely event. However, if such a system is properly considered a rail fixed guideway system, FTA's rules (49 CFR part 659) will apply to it.

COORDINATION OF THE FRA AND FTA PROGRAMS

FTA's rules on rail fixed guideway systems (49 CFR part 659) apply to any rapid transit systems or portions thereof not subject to FRA's rules. On rapid transit systems that are not sufficiently connected to the general railroad system to warrant FRA's exercise of jurisdiction (as explained above), FTA's rules will apply exclusively. On those rapid

transit systems that are connected to the general system in such a way as warrant exercise of FRA's jurisdiction, only those portions of the rapid transit system that are connected to the general system will generally be subject to FRA's rules.

A rapid transit railroad may apply to FRA for a waiver of any FRA regulations. See 49 CFR part 211. FRA will seek FTA's views whenever a rapid transit operation petitions FRA for a waiver of its safety rules. In granting or denying any such waiver, FRA will make clear whether its rules do not apply to any segments of the operation so that it is clear where FTA's rules do apply.

EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES

While civil penalties are the primary enforcement tool under the federal railroad safety laws, more extreme measures are available under certain circumstances. FRA has authority to issue orders directing compliance with the Federal Railroad Safety Act, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, the older safety statutes, or regulations issued under any of those statutes. See 45 U.S.C. 437(a) and (d), and 49 App. U.S.C. 1808(a). Such an order may issue only after notice and opportunity for a hearing in accordance with the procedures set forth in 49 CFR part 209, subpart C. FRA inspectors also have the authority to issue a special notice requiring repairs where a locomotive or freight car is unsafe for further service or where a segment of track does not meet the standards for the class at which the track is being operated. Such a special notice may be appealed to the regional director and the FRA Administrator. See 49 CFR part 216, subpart B.

FRA may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief in federal district court to restrain violations or enforce rules issued under the railroad safety laws. See 45 U.S.C. 439 and 49 App. U.S.C. 1810.

FRA also has the authority to issue, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, an order prohibiting an individual from performing safety-sensitive functions in the rail industry for a specified period. This disqualification authority is exercised under procedures found at 49 CFR part 209, subpart D.

Criminal penalties are available for willful violations of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act or its regulations. See 49 App. U.S.C. 1809(b), and 49 CFR 209.131, 133. Criminal penalties are also available under 45 U.S.C. 438(e) for knowingly and willfully falsifying, destroying, or failing to complete records or reports required to be kept under the various railroad safety statutes and regulations. The Accident Reports Act, 45 U.S.C. 39, also contains criminal penalties.

Perhaps FRA's most sweeping enforcement tool is its authority to issue emergency safety orders "where an unsafe condition or practice, or a combination of unsafe condi-

tions or practices, or both, create an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons * * *" 45 U.S.C. 432(a). After its issuance, such an order may be reviewed in a trial-type hearing. See 49 CFR 211.47 and 216.21 through 216.27. The emergency order authority is unique because it can be used to address unsafe conditions and practices whether or not they contravene an existing regulatory or statutory requirement. Given its extraordinary nature, FRA has used the emergency order authority sparingly.

[53 FR 52920, Dec. 29, 1988, as amended at 63 FR 11619, Mar. 10, 1998; 64 FR 62864, Nov. 17, 1999; 65 FR 42544, July 10, 2000; 69 FR 30592, May 28, 2004]

APPENDIX B TO PART 209—FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION GUIDELINES FOR INITIAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ASSESSMENTS

These guidelines establish benchmarks to be used in determining initial civil penalty assessments for violations of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). The guideline penalty amounts reflect the best judgment of the FRA Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance (RRS) and of the Safety Law Division of the Office of Chief Counsel (RCC) on the relative severity, on a scale of \$275 to \$32,500, of the various violations routinely encountered by FRA inspectors. (49 U.S.C. 5123) Unless otherwise specified, the guideline amounts refer to average violations, that is, violations involving a hazardous material with a medium level of hazard, and a violator with an average compliance history. In an "average violation," the respondent has committed the acts due to a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances ("knowingly"). For some sections, the guidelines contain a breakdown according to relative severity of the violation, for example, the guidelines for shipping paper violations at 49 CFR §§ 172.200–203. All penalties in these guidelines are subject to change depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The general duty sections, for example §§ 173.1 and 174.7, are not ordinarily cited as separate violations; they are primarily used as explanatory citations to demonstrate applicability of a more specific section where applicability is otherwise unclear.

FRA believes that infractions of the regulations that lead to personal injury are especially serious; this is directly in line with Department of Transportation policy that hazardous materials are only safe for transportation when they are securely sealed in a proper package. (Some few containers, such as tank cars of carbon dioxide, are designed to vent off excess internal pressure. They are exceptions to the "securely sealed" rule.)